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Abstract
Zaccour (2008) investigates the behaviour of a marketing channel where firms
invest in advertising to increase brand equity, showing that an exogenous two-
part tariff cannot be used to replicate the vertically integrated monopolist’s
performance. I revisit the same model proving the existence of a multiplicity
of franchising contracts taht can do the job. In particular, I set out by
illustrating an optimal two-part tariff specified as a linear function of the
upstream firm’s advertising effort, performing this task both in the static
and in the dynamic game. then, I show that an analogous result emerges (i)
in the static game by writing the fixed component of the two-part tariff as a
non-linear function of the manufacturer’s advertising effort; and (ii) by using
a contract which is linear in the brand equity, in the dynamic case.
Keywords: marketing channel, vertical relations, vertical integration,
advertising
JEL Codes: L21, M31, M37
1 Introduction
The analysis of marketing channel behaviour is a core issue which has re-
mained at the top of the research agenda in this field for at least thirty
years, following the seminal contribution by Jeuland and Shugan (1983) and
has also attracted a lot of attention in the literature on the theory of the firm
belonging to the companion field of industrial economics (since Williamson,
1971; and Klein et al., 1978). A growing literature has progressively expanded
the baseline model to account for the effects of (i) competition among retail-
ers (Ingene and Parry, 1995); (ii) a dominant firm’s position (Riordan, 1998;
Raju and Zhang, 2005; Chen and Xiao, 2009); (iii) stochastic demand func-
tions (Lariviere, 1999); (iv) remanufacturing (Savaskan et al., 2004); and (v)
advertising (Yue et al., 2006; Zaccour, 2008).
Perhaps the most important aspect of this debate is how to specify the
franchising contract, having in mind the objective of replicating in full the
performance of a vertically integrated firm. While this task is not problem-
atic if the only variable involved is price (or quantity), it becomes somewhat
more intriguing when investments also enter the picture, and even more so
if the model takes the form of a dynamic game. Indeed, it all boils down
to specifying the equilibrium set of contracts, including - if possible - all
the relevant features of the vertical relation taking place along the supply
chain (Klein et al., 1978; Zusman and Etgar, 1981; Grout, 1984; Cachon and
Lariviere, 2005, inter alia). May one write an efficient set of contracts safe-
guarding the firms’ strategic incentives all along the marketing channel? Or,
is it possible to write a franchising contract preventing the well known hold-
up problem (that is, the arising of ex post opportunistic behavior) usually
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associated with asset specifity? This is a way of telling this story revealing its
proximity or analogy with well known phenomena deeply investigated in the
theory of vertical integration when some form of investment is at stake (see
Williamson, 1975; Klein et al., 1978; Grout, 1984; Joskow, 1985, 1987, 2005;
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990, among many others).
The present paper nests into this line of research, being directly connected
to Zaccour (2008), where it is argued that a two-part tariff allowing the mar-
keting channel to attain the collectively optimal solution as an equilibrium
of a decentralised game does not exist. This negative result is claimed in
a model in which two vertically related firms invest in an advertising cam-
paign aimed at increasing the goodwill effect (or, the brand equity), and the
static and dynamic versions of the problem are both investigated. Using the
same setup, I prove the existence of a multiplicity of optimal two-part tariffs
driving the channel to the efficient outcome. First, I propose a tariff whose
fixed component is a linear function of the upstream firm’s advertising ef-
fort. If such a tariff is used in the franchising contract, the upstream firm
can drive the supply chain to replicate the profits as well as the price and
advertising strategies of a vertically integrated monopolist (and can appro-
priate the entire channel profits). I also show that the same result obtains
if the upstream firm commits to its own optimal share of the advertising
campaign, provided that this effort be specified in terms of the demand and
intertemporal parameters of the model.
Additionally, I show that the efficient outcome can also be achieved by
specifying the fixed fee appearing in the two-part tariff as a non-linear func-
tion of the manufacturer’s investment, in two different but ultimately equiv-
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alent ways (in the static model). Finally, applying what is a well known
solution method in hierarchical differential games, I also illustrate the pos-
sibility of reaching the efficient outcome by defining the fixed fee as a linear
function of the state variable, i.e., the brand equity (in the dynamic model).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 contains
a short sketch of the well known optimal two-part tariff when only market
variables are involved. The static version of the model is investigated in
Section 2, while the dynamic game (including the commitment case) is in
Section 3. The alternative solutions of the static and dynamic models are
laid out in Section 4. Concluding comments are in Section 5.
2 The simplest two-part tariff model
As a sort of incipit, this short paragraph briefly summarises the efficient use
of a two part tariff as illustrated in Jeuland and Shugan (1983, 1988a,b) and
Moorthy (1987). Consider a vertical relation (a channel) between a manufac-
turer, M , and a retailer, R. Assume the manufacturer has a constant returns
to scale technology with a unit production cost c > 0, and no investment in
R&D or advertising is carried out by either firm. The market demand func-
tion is Q = β−αp, and the unit price paid by the retailer to the manufacturer
for each unit of the good is w. In such a case, the vertically integrated firm
would attain full monopoly profits pim = (β − αc)
2 / (4α) , and the standard
view holds that vertically separated channel can replicate it by adopting a
two part tariff whereby w = c+k/Q, or equivalently that each unit is sold by
the manufacturer at marginal cost c but the retailer has to pay a fixed fee k
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as well, so that the two-part tariff is in fact written as TPT = cQ+k, k being
the fixed component. If the latter is indeed set at the full monopoly profit
level, then in equilibrium the retailer obtains piR = (β − αc)
2 / (4α)− k = 0
and the manufacturer obtains piM = k = (β − αc)
2 / (4α) . As a result, the
overall channel profits are the same as under vertical integration. This con-
solidated conclusion has been incorporated into the standard literature on
vertical relations and supply chain coordination (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988, ch.
4; Cachon, 2003; and Ingene and Parry, 2004, among many others).
3 The static problem
The baseline model is the same as in Zaccour (2008, p. 1234). There exists a
marketing channel in which two firms linked by a vertical relation may invest
in advertising to increase goodwill, so that market demand writes:
Q = β + aM + aR − αp (1)
where Q is the output level, p is market price and αM and αR are the ad-
vertising efforts of the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. Each
advertising campaign involves a quadratic cost Ci = a
2
i /2, i = M,R, so that
the two firms’ profit functions are:
piM = (w − c)Q−
a2M
2
; piR = (p− w)Q−
a2R
2
, (2)
while the profit function of the vertically integrated firm is:
piV I = (p− c)Q−
a2M
2
−
a2R
2
. (3)
4
In (2-3), c ∈ (0, β) is the constant marginal production cost, and w is the unit
price at which the manufacturer sells the product to the retailer. Demand
parameters α and β are both positive, with α > 1 and β > αc.
Consider first the vertically integrated solution. From the system of first
order conditions (FOCs):
∂piV I
∂p
= β + aM + aR − α (2p− c) = 0
∂piV I
∂aM
= p− c− aM = 0 (4)
∂piV I
∂aR
= p− c− aR = 0
one gets the optimal triple
p∗ =
β + c (α− 2)
2 (α− 1)
; a∗M = a
∗
R =
β − αc
2 (α− 1)
, (5)
which are admissible if demand and cost parameters {α, β, c} satisfy the
aforementioned conditions (cf. Zaccour, 2008, p. 1235). The corresponding
equilibrium output and profits are:
Q∗ =
α (β − αc)
2 (α− 1)
; pi∗V I =
(β − αc)2
4 (α− 1)
. (6)
Now, what if the vertically separated firms try to replicate the perfor-
mance of the vertically integrated one by resorting to a two-part tariff de-
fined as above, i.e., with an exogenously given fixed fee k? The result is that,
by doing so, any incentive for the manufacturer to carry out its advertising
campaign just disappears altogether - a clearcut example of the aforemen-
tioned hold-up problem. To see this, one proceeds by backward induction,
maximising the retailer’s profits
piR = (p− w) (β + aM + aR − αp)−
a2R
2
− k (7)
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w.r.t. p and aR, to obtain (superscript T stands for two-part tariff ):
pT =
β + c (α− 1) + aM
2α− 1
; aTR =
β − αc+ aM
2α− 1
(8)
that can be plugged into piM together with w = c to verify that the manufac-
turer’s profit function becomes piM = k − a
2
M/2, entailing that the optimal
advertising effort of the upstream firm is nil. Indeed, it I am about to illus-
trate that there is more to it, as there exists a way of specifying the fixed
component of the two-part tariff that allows the marketing channel to ex-
actly replicate the profit performance as well as the output and advertising
investment of the vertically integrated monopolist.
To see this, write k = x+ yaM , that is, specify the fixed fee as a function
of the manufacturer’s advertising effort. In such a way, the fee remains fixed
in that it is not a function of output, but allows one to rewrite the upstream
firm’s profit function as follows:
piM = x+ yaM −
a2M
2
, (9)
which yields the following FOC:
∂piM
∂aM
= y − aM = 0 (10)
and therefore aTM = y, which obviously requires y > 0. If so, then the total
channel advertising effort amounts to
aTM + a
T
R =
α (2y − c) + β
2α− 1
(11)
with aTM + a
T
R = a
∗
M + a
∗
R in correspondence of y = (β − cα) / [2 (α− 1)] =
a∗M = a
∗
R. This exercise proves:
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Lemma 1 If y = (β − cα) / [2 (α− 1)] , total advertising investment and its
single components along the marketing channel replicate the behaviour of the
vertically integrated firm.
There remains to assess the profit performance and the distribution of
such profits in correspondence of this particular specification of the two-part
tariff. The sum of retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits is:
piTM + pi
T
R = pi
∗
V I =
(β − αc)2
4 (α− 1)
(12)
while the retailer’s profits are
piTR =
(β − αc)2 (2α− 3)− 8x (α− 1)2
8 (α− 1)2
. (13)
Consequently, setting x = (β − αc)2 (2α− 3) /
[
8 (α− 1)2
]
, the manufac-
turer can appropriate the entire channel profits in correspondence of the
efficient solution which would be attained under vertical integration. This
amounts to saying
Proposition 2 In correspondence of y = (β − cα) / [2 (α− 1)] and x =
(β − αc)2 (2α− 3) /
[
8 (α− 1)2
]
, the channel’s performance is the same as
the vertically integrated monopolist’s, and the entire profits accrue to the up-
stream firm.
In other words, this contract entails setting
k = x+ yaR =
(β − αc)2 (2α− 1)
8 (α− 1)2
> 0. (14)
As an ancillary but relevant remark, it is worth stressing that (12-13) also
imply the following:
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Corollary 3 There exist infinitely many optimal contracts allowing the sup-
ply chain to perform efficiently, summarised by any pair y = (β − cα) / [2 (α− 1)]
and x ∈
{
x|piTR ≥ 0
}
.
Needless to say, the choice of the specific contract driving to zero the
retailer’s profits is the most advantageous for the manufacturer, which might
instead leave the retailer with some positive (but arbitrarily small) profit ε
by setting x̂ = x− ε.
4 The dynamic problem
Again, the model is the same as in Zaccour (2008, pp. 1236-37). The time
horizon is infinite, with t ∈ [0,∞) , and both firms share the same intertem-
poral preferences summarised by the discount rate ρ > 0. Advertising con-
trols are aM (t) and aR (t) , entailing instantaneous costs Ci [ai (t)] = a
2
i /2,
i = M,R. The production of the final good involves a constant marginal cost
c. The goodwill (or brand equity) dynamics is
·
B (t) = aM (t) + aR (t)− δB (t) , (15)
with the initial condition B (0) = B0 > 0; parameter δ > 0 is the constant
decay rate. The instantaneous demand function is Q (t) = µ+B (t)−αp (t) ,
with α > 1/ [δ (δ + ρ)] and µ > αc.1
The equilibrium solution for the vertically integrated channel is described
in Zaccour (2008, Proposition 1, p. 1237), and is briefly summarised here
1The condition α > 1/ [δ (δ + ρ)] is required for stability, while the second condition on
µ ensures that the brand equity be positive in equilibrium.
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(in the remainder, the explicit indication of the time argument is omitted for
brevity). Adopting the quadratic value function V (B) = ϕ
1
B2/2+ϕ
2
B+ϕ
3
,
one obtains the vector of optimal controls:
pV I (B) =
µ+B + αc
2α
aV Ii (B) = ϕ1B + ϕ2, i = M,R
(16)
with
ϕ
1
=
α (2δ + ρ)−
√
α
[
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 4
]
4α
ϕ
2
=
µ− αc
2α (2ϕ
1
− δ − ρ)
ϕ
3
=
4αϕ2
2
− (µ− αc)2
4αρ
(17)
It is worth noting that in Zaccour (2008, p. 1237) the expression of ϕ
2
does
not contain α at the denominator. As a result, the equilibrium level of the
brand equity, which is
BV I =
µ− αc
αδ (δ − ρ)− 1
(18)
in Zaccour (2008, pp. 1237-38) is multiplied by α. This has no particu-
lar consequences on the second step of Zaccour’s analysis, portrayed in his
Proposition 2 (Zaccour, 2008, p. 1238), which shows that, when the two
firms are independent units, the wholesale two-part tariff w = c + k/Q can-
not allow the marketing channel to replicate the performance of the vertically
integrated supply chain, the reason being that piM = k − a
2
M/2 says that it
is efficient for the manufacturer not to invest at all in advertising. Moreover,
neither a precommitment on the part of the manufacturer to carry out his
own share of advertising, aR = ϕ1B + ϕ2, can do the job (Zaccour, 2008,
Proposition 3, p. 1238) All this indeed holds true as long as k is exogenous.
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I am about to show that taking the same route as in the above static model,
this conclusion flips over altogether.
For the moment, write the two-part tariff as w = c + k/Q. Posing the
retailer’s value function as VR (B) = θ1B
2/2+θ2B+θ3, the retailers’ Bellman
equation is
ρVR (B) = max
p,aR
[(
p−
k
B + µ− αp
)
(B + µ− αp)
−
a2R
2
+ (θ1B + θ2) (aM + aR − δB)
]
(19)
which generates the following optimal controls:
pT (B) =
µ+B + αc
2α
aTR = θ1B + θ2.
(20)
These can be substituted back into (19), rewriting thus the latter as
[1 + 2α (θ1 − 2δ − ρ) θ1]B
2
4α
+
[µ− α (2 (δ + ρ) θ2 − 2 (aM + θ2) θ1 + c)]B
2α
+
α2c2 + µ2 + 2α [θ2 (θ2 + 2aM)− cµ− 2 (k + ρθ3)]
4α
= 0. (21)
Solving the resulting system of three equations w.r.t. the unknown parame-
ters {θ1, θ2, θ3} , one obtains:
2
θ3 =
α2c2 + µ2 + 2α [θ2 (θ2 + 2aM)− cµ− 2k]
4αρ
θ2 =
µ+ α (2θ1aM − c)
4αρ
θ1 =
α (2δ + ρ)−
√
α
[
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 2
]
2α
(22)
2The larger solution for θ1 is disregarded as it cannot ensure stability.
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Now turn to the manufacturer’s Bellman equation:
ρVM (B) = max
p,aR
[
k −
a2M
2
+
∂VM (B)
∂B
(
aM + a
T
R − δB
)]
(23)
in which aTR corresponds to the expression appearing in (20). Hence, (23)
can be rewritten as[(
a2M + 2 (VM (B)− k)
)√
α
(
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 2
)
+ 2
∂VM (B)
∂B
(B (2αδ (δ + ρ)− 1)− µ)
+α
(
ρ
(
a2M + 2 (ρVM (B)− k)
)
+ 2
∂VM (B)
∂B
(c− 2aM (δ + ρ))
)]
/ (24)[
2
(
αρ +
√
α
(
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 2
))]
= 0.
Now, following the same procedure as in the static problem, one can set
k = v +maM , where parameters v and m are to be identified appropriately
in the remainder, so that the resulting FOC for the maximisation of (24)
w.r.t. aM yields:
aTM =
m
√
α
(
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 2
)
+ α
[
2
∂VM (B)
∂B
δ + ρ
(
m+ 2
∂VM (B)
∂B
)]
αρ +
√
α
(
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 2
) .
(25)
The next step consists in specifying the manufacturer’s value function as
VM (B) = ψ1B
2/2 + ψ
2
B + ψ
3
, with ∂VM (B) /∂B = ψ1B + ψ2, and then
solve the system of three equations implied by (24) w.r.t. the unknown
parameters {ψ
1
, ψ
2
, ψ
3
} . This delivers:
ψ
1
= ψ
2
= 0, ψ
3
=
4v + 3m2
ρ
. (26)
It is worth noting that (26) says that ‘the state variable is irrelevant’, and the
manufacturer’s problem collapses onto a quasi-static one. Before proceeding
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any further, it is worth noting that the above result implies that any credible
precommitment by the manufacturer cannot be based on the parameters of
its value function (for more on this aspect, see below).
Imposing stationarity on the state variable, one obtains
BT =
µ+ α [2 (δ + ρ)m− c]
2αδ (δ + ρ)− 1
. (27)
Moreover, the individual and total advertising efforts along the marketing
channel simplify as follows:
aTM = y ; a
T
M + a
T
R =
δ [µ+ α (2 (δ + ρ)m− c)]
2αδ (δ + ρ)− 1
(28)
the latter being equal to aV I = δ (µ− αc) / [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1] at
m =
δ (µ− αc)
2 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]
=
aV I
2
(29)
which also ensures aTM = a
T
R = a
V I/2.
Concerning profits, we have that
piTM + pi
T
R = pi
V I =
δ2 (µ− αc)2
[
α (δ + ρ)2 − 1
]
4 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]2
(30)
and
piTM =
δ2 (µ− αc)2
8 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]2
+ v = piV I (31)
in v = δ2 (µ− αc)2
[
2α (δ + ρ)2 − 3
]
/
[
8 (αδ (δ + ρ)− 1)2
]
.
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 4 Adopting the two-part tariff w + k/Q, with k = v + maM
and
v =
δ2 (µ− αc)2
[
2α (δ + ρ)2 − 3
]
8 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]2
; m =
δ (µ− αc)
2 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]
=
aV I
2
,
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the manufacturer (i) induces the marketing channel to replicate the adver-
tising and profit performance of the vertically integrated monopolist and (ii)
appropriates the whole profits generated by the supply chain.
The bottom line of the analysis carried out in both the static and the
dynamic settings is that the efficient two-part tariff must be defined in terms
of the manufacturer’s advertising effort, in such a way as to restore the incen-
tive for the upstream firm to exactly replicate the advertising campaign that
the upstream division of a vertically integrated monopolist would carry out.
In this sense, the fixed part of the tariff administers the appropriate stim-
ulus to the manufacturer, as illustrated by (25). Relatedly, it is also worth
stressing that this outcome and the franchising contract which generates it
are strongly time consistent - not only because this is a feedback equilibrium
(which is the technical reason), but because it is in the manufacturer’s best
interest to perform his share of the optimal advertising campaign and then
use the coefficients of the two-part tariff to appropriate monopoly profits: any
deviations by the manufacturer from this line of behaviour would jeopardise
its profits.
As a last step of this part of the analysis, one can ask whether the static
problem can be considered as a special case of the dynamic one. A quick ex-
amination of equilibrium magnitudes reveals that it is indeed so. To make the
two settings directly comparable, fix β = µ, so that the vertical intercept of
the demand function, in absence of brand equity effects driven by advertising
campaigns, is indeed the same. Having done that, all the equilibrium mag-
nitudes observed in correspondence of the equilibrium of the dynamic game
coincide with those characterising the equilibrium of the static game if δ = 1
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and ρ = 0 (one needs not take limits to verify this, as simple substitutions
do the job). That is to say:
Corollary 5 If the goodwill instantaneous decay rate is 100% and firms do
not discount future gains, then the dynamic solution of the feedback game
collapses onto the solution of the static game.
This conclusion is strongly reminiscent of qualitatively analogous results
attained in applications of differential games to completely different issues
(such as the sticky price game dating back to Simaan and Takayama, 1978,
and further investigated by Fershtman and Kamien, 1987; Dockner, 1988;
and Cellini and Lambertini, 2004, 2007).
4.1 The commitment solution
Zaccour (2008, p. 1236) shows that, in the static setup, a commitment to
perform its own share of the advertising campaign on the part of the man-
ufacturer - alongside with the two-part tariff - allows the supply chain to
replicate the performance of a vertically integrated monopolist. There re-
mains to investigate whether the same result obtains in the dynamic setting,
if the manufacturer commits to its own share of advertising investment,
aM = a
V I
M =
δ (µ− αc)
2 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]
(32)
accompanied by the two-art tariff w = c + k/Q (the bar on aM indicates
the presence of a commitment) Note that (32) defines the manufacturer’s
commitment in terms of the model parameters, instead of the parameters
of the manufacturer’s value function {ψ
1
, ψ
2
} and the state variable B as in
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Zaccour (2008, p. 1238, proof of Proposition 3). The reason is that, as shown
above, ψ
1
= ψ
2
= 0, and therefore writing the contract in this way could not
work (as stressed by Zaccour): in fact, the above argument illustrates that
the requirement that {ψ
1
, ψ
2
} coincide with the parameters characterising
the vertically integrated solution is misleading as the optimal two-part tariff
turns the manufacturer’s problem into a quasi-static one. Therefore, one has
instead to specify aM as in (32) and then check whether the solution of the
retailer’s Bellman equation:
ρVR (B) = max
p,aR
[(
p−
k
B + µ− αp
)
(B + µ− αp)
−
a2R
2
+ (θ1B + θ2)
(
δ (µ− αc)
2 (αδ (δ + ρ)− 1)
+ aR − δB
)]
(33)
is the same as above. Indeed, the FOCs taken on (33) generate (20). This
is obvious, as the above expression is additively separable in the two firms’
advertising efforts, and therefore the manufacturer’s behaviour does not enter
the retailer’s optimality conditions. Solving the resulting system of three
equations w.r.t. the unknown parameters {θ1, θ2, θ3} , one obtains:
θ3 =
[(
α2c2 + µ2 − 2α (2k + cµ)
)
(αδ (δ + ρ)− 1)
+2αθ2 (θ2 (αδ (δ + ρ)− 1) + δ (µ− αc))] /
[4αρ (αδ (δ + ρ)− 1)] (34)
and
θ2 =
(µ− αc) [αδ (δ + ρ + θ1)− 1]
2α (αδ (δ + ρ)− 1) (δ + ρ− θ1)
θ1 =
α (2δ + ρ)−
√
α
[
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 2
]
2α
(35)
This yields aR = a
T
M = a
V I
M = a
V I/2.Then, solving
·
B = 0, we have the same
solution as in (18). The final exercise consists in verifying that total channel
15
profits do coincide with piV I in (30). The answer is positive, as
piM + piR = pi
V I =
δ2 (µ− αc)2
[
α (δ + ρ)2 − 1
]
4 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]2
(36)
with
piM = k −
δ2 (µ− αc)2
8 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]2
(37)
so that the manufacturer can grasp the whole monopoly profits by setting
k =
δ2 (µ− αc)2
[
2α (δ + ρ)2 − 1
]
8 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]2
. (38)
This proves:
Proposition 6 The precommitment solution
aM =
δ (µ− αc)
2 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]
; w = c+ k/Q ; k =
δ2 (µ− αc)2
[
2α (δ + ρ)2 − 1
]
8 [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]2
allows the marketing channel to replicate the performance of the vertically
integrated firm.
5 Alternative solutions
Here I will pursue some alternative routes, the first two to deal with the
static model, the third with the dynamic one, respectively. In the static
case, it can be shown that (i) if the fixed fee is explicitly designed to transfer
the full profits to the manufacturer, then the investment incentive of the
latter is fully restored; and (ii) the solution envisaged for the dynamic case is
indebted with what is by now a standard approach to generating Markovian
equilibria in Stackelberg differential games, as it consists in specifying the
leader’s strategy as a linear function of the state variable (see Dockner et al.,
2000, pp. 134-41).
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5.1 The static problem: route I
The first possibility consists in deriving the optimal price and advertising
effort of the retailer, which coincide with (8), and then in simplifying the
retailer’s profits with w = c, given a generic level of the manufacturer’s
advertising effort aM :
piR =
(β + aM − αc)
2
2 (2α− 1)
− k. (39)
Finally, one has to impose
kT =
(β + aM − αc)
2
2 (2α− 1)
(40)
which is tantamount to saying that the fixed fee operates a complete transfer
of profits from the downstream firm to the upstream one.3
Moving upwards, the manufacturer has to maximise the following profit
function:
piM =
(β + aM − αc)
2
2 (2α− 1)
−
a2M
2
(41)
with ∂piM/∂aM = 0 at
aM =
β − αc
2 (α− 1)
= a∗M . (42)
All of the resulting expression (the retailer’s advertising and price, as well as
channel profits) coincide with those associated with the vertically integrated
equilibrium. The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
3A softer version of the same scheme would be to set
k =
(β + aM − αc)
2
2 (2α− 1)
− ε
with ε ∈
(
0, (β + aM − αc)
2 / [2 (2α− 1)]
)
.
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Proposition 7 The two-part tariff identified by
w = c and kT = (β + aM − αc)
2 / [2 (2α− 1)]
solves the problem of coordinating the vertical channel, leading the latter to
replicate the performance of the vertically integrated firm. The entire channel
profits accrue to the upstream firm.
It is worth stressing that this solution is close in spirit to that usually
adopted in vertical relation models with franchising, without investments of
any sort, as already illustrated in Section 2. The only difference is that here
the fixed fee has to take explicitly into account the manufacturer’s effort aM .
5.2 The static problem: route II
Alternatively, exploiting an analogy with the theory of potential games (Slade,
1994; Monderer and Shapley, 1996),4 one may reformulate the research ques-
tion as follows: may the marketing channel coordination game involving
advertising efforts admit a potential, and may the latter reproduce with the
profits of a vertically integrated monopolist, through the use of an appro-
priate two-part tariff? More precisely, is it possible to identify a two-part
tariff such that, indeed, the potential function replicating the equilibrium
between two vertically related but independent firms also replicates the ob-
jective function of the vertically integrated firm, and therefore equilibrium
profits coincide across the two cases? In this respect, we already know that
4This branch of game theory has been largely developed for static games, although
some preliminary results are available also for differential games. See Dragone et al.
(2008, 2012).
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the Stackelberg game involving only a price or quantity choice does admit a
potential via the well known two-part tariff outlined at the outset, and that
this potential corresponds to the vertically integrated solution. The issue is
now whether the present problem, enriched by the presence of advertising
efforts, delivers an analogous outcome or not.
To answer this question, observe the first order condition of the vertically
integrated firm w.r.t. aM , given the price p
T in (8):
pT − c− aM =
β − cα− 2aM (b− 1)
2α− 1
. (43)
By imposing pT − c− aM = 0, one gets precisely the same advertising effort
associated with the vertically integrated solution (5). Accordingly, take the
indefinite integral∫
β − cα− 2aM (α− 1)
2α− 1
daM =
aM [β − cα− aM (α− 1)]
2α− 1
+ C ≡ Ξ (aM)
(44)
where C is the integration constant, which can be set equal to zero for
simplicity and without further loss of generality. Then, solve
Ξ (aM)− piM =
aM [β − cα− aM (α− 1)]
2α− 1
− k +
a2M
2
= 0 (45)
w.r.t. k, to obtain
kT =
aM [aM + 2 (β − cα)]
2 (2α− 1)
. (46)
This amounts to imposing that the manufacturer profits, piM = k − a
2
MR/2,
be equal to a function Ξ (aM) of its advertising effort obtained by integrating
w.r.t. aM the first order condition of the vertically integrated monopolist
w.r.t. the same variable. It is worth noting that the above procedure yields
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a specification of the fixed fee which is non-linear in the manufacturer’s ad-
vertising effort.
Once k has been defined as in (46), the resulting profit function of the
manufacturer, piM
(
kT
)
, produces the FOC:
∂piM
∂aM
=
2 (1− α) aM + β − cα
2α− 1
= 0 (47)
whereby the optimal advertising effort is aTM = a
∗
M , i.e., the same as under the
vertically integrated solution. The same holds for the equilibrium consumer
price and quantity and the advertising effort of the retailer. The equilibrium
profits are:
piTM =
(β − cα)2
4 (2α− 1) (α− 1)
; piTR =
(β − cα)2
2 (2α− 1)
, (48)
with piTM + pi
T
R = pi
∗
V I and pi
T
R > pi
T
M for all α > 3/2. That is:
Proposition 8 The two-part tariff identified by
w = c and kT = aM [aM + 2 (β − cα)] / [2 (2α− 1)]
solves the problem of coordinating the vertical channel, leading the latter to
replicate the performance of the vertically integrated firm. In this case, how-
ever, the retailer earns positive profits, which are larger than the manufac-
turer if the demand function is steep enough.
To summarise: the retailer maximises (7) w.r.t. p and aR, with k = k
T ,
which leaves unaffected the retailer’s FOCs as kT is a function of aM only
(plus obviously the demand and cost parameters). Going backwards to the
first stage of the sequential game, the use of kT allows to reproduce the same
advertising incentive for the manufacturer as in the vertically integrated case.
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Therefore, in both cases the solution to Jeuland and Shugan’s problem
consists in specifying the contract (that is, the two part tariff) in terms of
the manufacturer effort, in particular as a quadratic function of the latter.
This remains, in a sense, exogenous to the retailer’s behaviour (for the reason
stated above), although it is not entirely exogenous to the vertical relation as
a whole, as it is conditional on the advertising investment of firm M . What
matters is that imposing k = kT (i) has no influence on the retailer’s FOCs,
but restores the manufacturer’s incentive to carry out the efficient advertising
investment; and (ii) involves writing the franchising contract not in terms of
a fixed fee but an endogenous one, that still poses no time inconsistency issue
as it does not enter the retailer’s optimality conditions.
5.3 The dynamic setup
This is an alternative view of the hierarchical differential game along the
marketing channel. Using again w = c + k/Q, the analysis of the dynamic
game replicates (19-22). Here, however, I pose k = v + mB, so that the
Bellman equation of the manufacturer becomes
ρVM (B) = max
p,aR
[
v +mB −
a2M
2
+
∂VM (B)
∂B
(
aM + a
T
R − δB
)]
(49)
with aTR = θ1B + θ2. Supposing VM (B) = ψ1B
2/2 + ψ
2
B + ψ
3
, the FOC
w.r.t. aM yields
aTM =
2α (δ + ρ)
∂VM (B)
∂B
(δ + ρ)
αρ+
√
α
(
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 2
) (50)
which, substituted back into (49), gives rise to a system of three equations
in the unknown parameters {ψ
1
, ψ
2
, ψ
3
} . The solution of this system is the
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following triple:
ψ
3
=
[
αψ
2
(
µρ+ α
(
2ψ
2
(δ + ρ)2 − cρ
))
+ 2α
(
α
(
2δ (δ + ρ) + ρ2
)
− 1
)
v+
(2αρv + ψ
2
(µ− cα)) Ω] /
[
2αρ
(
α
(
2δ (δ + ρ) + ρ2
)
− 1 + ρ
)
Ω
]
, (51)
with Ω ≡
√
α
(
α (2δ + ρ)2 − 2
)
; and
ψ
2
=
2αm
αρ +Ω
; ψ
1
= 0, (52)
so that (51-52) reveal that the use of a state-dependent rule turns the up-
stream firm’s problem into a linear state one.
The steady state value of B is then
B =
(µ− cα) [1− 2αδ (δ + ρ)]2 + 4α2 (δ + ρ)2 [α (2δ (δ + ρ) + ρ2)− 1− ρΩ]m
[2αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]3
(53)
and fixing
m =
δ (µ− cα) [1− 2αδ (δ + ρ)]2
4α (δ + ρ) [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1] [α (2δ (δ + ρ) + ρ2)− 1− ρΩ]
(54)
ensures aTM + a
T
R = a
V I , aTM = a
V I
M = a
V I/2 and BT = BV I , with piTM + pi
T
R =
piV I as well. If the manufacturer sets
v =
δ (µ− cα)2
[
2
(
1 + α2δ (δ + ρ)3
)
− α (5δ (δ + ρ) + 2ρ2)− 2ρΩ
]
8α (δ + ρ) [αδ (δ + ρ)− 1]2
, (55)
then piTM = pi
V I and piTR = 0.
The foregoing discussion can be summed up as follows:
Proposition 9 The marketing channel can replicate the outcome of a ver-
tically integrated monopolist using a two-part tariff in which the fixed fee is
linear in the stock of brand equity.
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6 Concluding remarks
I have illustrated the possibility for a supply chain consisting of two verti-
cally related but independent firms of using an optimal two-part tariff to
achieve efficiency, in a setting where firms are assumed to undertake costly
investments to increase the brand equity or goodwill. There emerges a non-
uniqueness result, as there is a multiplicity of two-part tariffs achieving the
desired outcome. In the dynamic setup, such a tariff may be specified in two
different forms, one being linear in the upstream firm’s advertising effort,
the other being linear in the state variable (the stock of goodwill). In both
cases, the fee remains independent of the output level. In the static setup,
efficiency can be attained through linear and non-linear contracts defined in
terms of the manufacturer’s effort.
Much remains to be done in order to explore the possibility of extend-
ing these results to a wider set of models, of which the present one repre-
sents a specific example. For instance, plausible routes to be pursued are
(i) allowing for oligopolistic interaction either upstream or downstream (or
both), leaving other essential elements of the model unmodified; (ii) explor-
ing the applicability of similar contracts in models where R&D for process
and product innovation replace advertising efforts; and (iii) allowing for more
sophisticated strategies such as market-share discounts (as in Calzolari and
Denicolò, 2013). These open issues are left for future research.
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